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Innovations in Mobility: Aerospace Digital Summitaerospace mobility leaders convene leverage cutting-edge technology, design, develop safety measures, integrate current regulations, suggest future policies, expand markets, diversify revenue streams.

Annual conference government policy, regulatory makers, automotive industry neutral forum discuss US government regulation, technology, customer acceptance future vehicle design. industry event safety, emission control, fuel efficiency, automated vehicles.

Registration for the Government/Industry Meeting will be open on September 1, 2023. Please check back soon.

If you are not able to attend WCX 2022 in-person, you will have the opportunity to join a selected number of live technical and executive discussions online that will advance your skill set in propulsion, connectivity security and safety as well as the business of technology.

On the other hand, the potential risks associated with CAV deployment related to technical vulnerabilities are safety and cybersecurity issues that may arise from flawed hardware and software. Cybersecurity and Digital Trust Issues in Connected and Automated Vehicles elaborates on these topics as unsettled cybersecurity and digital trust issues in CAVs and follows with recommendations to fill in the gaps in this evolving field. ...Cybersecurity and Digital Trust Issues in Connected and Automated Vehicles elaborates on these topics as unsettled cybersecurity and digital trust issues in CAVs and follows with recommendations to fill in the gaps in this evolving field. ...This report also highlights the importance of establishing robust cybersecurity protocols and fostering digital trust in these vehicles to ensure safe and secure deployment in our modern transportation system.

The development of highly automated driving functions (AD) recently rises the demand for so called Fail-Operational systems for native driving functions like steering and braking of vehicles. Fail-Operational systems shall guarantee the availability of driving functions even in presence of failures. This can also mean a degradation of system performance or limiting a system’s remaining operating period. In either case, the goal is independency from a human driver as a permanently situation-aware safety fallback solution to provide a certain level of autonomy. In parallel, the connectivity of modern vehicles is increasing rapidly and especially in vehicles with highly automated functions, there is a high demand for connected functions, Infotainment (web conference, Internet, Shopping) and Entertainment (Streaming, Gaming) to entertain the passengers, who should no longer occupied with driving tasks.

It is essential to note that cybersecurity threats not only arise from inherent protocol defects but also consider software implementation vulnerabilities.

The VCE Laboratory testbeds are connected with an Amazon Web Services (AWS) cloud-based Cyber-security Labs as a Service (CLaaS) system, which allows students and researchers to access the testbeds from any place that has a secure internet connection. ...VCE students are assigned predefined virtual machines to perform designated cyber-security experiments. The CLaaS system has low administrative overhead associated with experiment setup and management. ...VCE Laboratory CLaaS experiments have been developed for demonstrating man-in-the-middle cyber-security attacks from actual compromised hardware or software connected with the TestCube.

Since the early 1990’s, commercial vehicles have suffered from repeated vulnerability exploitations that resulted in a need for improved automotive cybersecurity. This paper outlines the strategies and challenges of implementing an automotive Zero Trust Architecture (ZTA) to secure intra-vehicle networks. ...This research successfully met the four requirements and demonstrated that using ZT principles in an on-vehicle network greatly improved the cybersecurity posture with manageable impact to system performance and deployment.

UNECE R155 explicitly references ISO/SAE 21434 and mandates a certified cybersecurity management system (CSMS) as a prerequisite for automotive manufacturers to achieve vehicle type approval and sell new vehicle types. ...However, the gap in the CSMS framework is a lack in a standardized system that provides guidance and common criteria for automakers to measure a vehicle’s level of compliance and compute a publicly accepted cybersecurity rating. To help establish increased consumer confidence, OEMs and smart mobility stakeholders could take additional proactive steps to ensure the safety and security of their products. ...This paper addresses the above requirement and discusses the cybersecurity rating framework (CSRF) that could establish a framework for rating vehicle cybersecurity by standardizing the measurement criteria, parameter vectors, process, and tools.

This paper gives a definition of the SDV concept, provides views from different aspects, discusses the progress in vehicle E/E architecture, especially zone-based architecture with centralized computation, and various technologies including High-Performance Computing (HPC) platform, standardized vehicle software architecture, advanced onboard communication, Over-The-Air (OTA) update, and cybersecurity etc. that collectively enable the realization of SDV.

The purpose of this SAE Aerospace Information Report (AIR) is to provide guidance for aircraft engine and propeller systems (hereafter referred to as propulsion systems) certification for cybersecurity. Compliance for cybersecurity requires that the engine control, propeller control, monitoring system, and all auxiliary equipment systems and networks associated with the propulsion system (such as nacelle systems, overspeed governors, and thrust reversers) be protected from intentional unauthorized electronic interactions (IUEI) that may result in an adverse effect on the safety of the propulsion system or the airplane.

IOOs and ADS developers agree that cost, communications, interoperability, cybersecurity, operation, maintenance, and other issues undercut efforts to deploy a comprehensive connected infrastructure.

Abstract The secure boot has successfully protected systems from executing untrusted software (SW), but low-power controllers lack sufficient time to check every memory cell while satisfying real-time functional safety requirements. Automotive controllers need to maintain security through multiple cycles of remote, unsupervised operation and safely reach a secure state when an anomaly is detected. To accelerate the boot time, we propose Sliced Secure Boot: build fingerprints by slicing orthogonally through memory blocks, protect each cell with a reusable fingerprint using a reproducible pattern with sufficient entropy, and randomly check one fingerprint pattern during boot. We do not claim that sampling offers equivalent protection to exhaustive checks but demonstrate that careful sampling can provide a sufficient level of detection while maintaining compatibility with both startup time and functional safety requirements.

AVSC Information Report for Change Risk Management AVSC00010202304 provides a process for change risk management for fleet-operated ADS-DVs using level 4 or 5 automation. The document addresses risks resulting from planned and unplanned changes in an ADS-DV design and/or operation. This information report is based on the concept of risk-informed decision-making. Making risk management decisions such as safety and change management, safety analysis, and safety assurance are especially applicable when moving from concept to production intent for the ADS-DV. Change Risk Management (CRM) does not replace best practices or other methods for managing safety anomalies or change management processes. It may instead be viewed as an additional resource that elaborates on how safety anomaly management and change management can be performed.